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Evaluating Active Labor Market Programs
in Transition Economies
Introduction1

1.

The theme of this conference, “Active Labor Market Programs: Improvement of
Effectiveness“ is a topic of central importance to human resource policy makers. The conference
aim is to help shape an evaluation strategy for government employment programs in the Russian
Federation. Over the past decade, several economies in transition from central planning to
market based resource allocation systems have devoted significant effort to measuring the
effectiveness of employment programs.
This paper provides an overview of the important issues involved in evaluation studies of
employment programs. Among economies in transition, my longest personal experience has
been in Hungary where the shift to a market economy is at an advanced stage. Examples of
evaluation experience in Hungary are used in this paper to illustrate the alternative methods of
evaluating active labor market programs.
The next section of the paper provides a simple statement of the alternative types of
outcome concepts which may be examined. These ideas are the foundation for the discussion of
performance monitoring and net impact estimation provided in the next two sections.
Explanations of each approach to evaluation includes enumeration of ways to use the results
along with caveats on interpretation of findings. The conclusion briefly considers the macroeconomic and political context of using evaluation results.
My conference remarks will supplement this prepared text in a few ways. I will mention
special issues associated with doing evaluations in the transition context and alternative
approaches. I will also suggest a unified strategy for developing an evaluation system for active
labor market programs which will support management, planning and program development.
2.

Concepts in Evaluation

In considering evaluations of employment programs it is important to be clear about the
distinct concepts which may be examined. In terms of program outcomes three main types are of
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This paper draws on personal experience evaluating active labor market programs with
World Bank funding in Hungary, Poland, and China. It is also influenced by methods used in
my work for the U.S. Department of Labor, Human Resources Development Canada, and the
International Labor Office. The latter work includes the recent publication by O’Leary,
Nesporova and Samorodov (2001). The outline of the paper and conference remarks closely
follow the structure of an address I presented to the World Association of Public Employment
Services (WAPES) conference in Budapest, Hungary, during March, 2000.
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interest: gross outcomes, gross impacts, and net impacts. A gross outcome is simply the mean of
an outcome of interest among program participants. A gross impact is the difference between
program participants and non-participants on an outcome of interest. Gross impacts are of little
use in understanding program effectiveness, and can be misleading to program management and
policy decisions. Net impacts are the difference between mean outcomes of a representative
sample of program participants and an appropriate sample of persons not receiving services.
Great care must be taken in forming the latter group which is called the comparison group.
Proper net impact estimation can be done through random assignment in experimental studies, or
by using statistical means to mimic the ideal of an experiment.
To firmly set distinct outcome concepts, consider a program intended to improve the
chances of reemployment. Among program participants and the comparison group we may
examine the rate of reemployment. Suppose that the rate of reemployment among program
participants is 60 percent, that the observed rate among all previously unemployed is 40 percent
and, that the rate among an appropriately chosen comparison group is 50 percent. In this
example the program gross outcome is 60 percent, the program gross impact is 20 percent, and
the program net impact is 10 percent.
The two most popular evaluation techniques for employment programs are performance
monitoring--usually of gross outcomes, and net impact estimation. Net impact estimation is
ideally conducted through classically designed field experiments. However, usually net impact
estimation done by a cheaper and quicker quasi-experimental method which relies on statistical
methods to mimic an experiment.
3.

Performance Monitoring

Performance monitoring of gross program outcomes is usually done as part of a
management system with an annual cycle. The process to develop and use such a system should:
have nation-wide involvement of all interested parties, involve clear goal setting for each
program monitored, and have agreement on the best performance indicators of reaching goals.2
The system should be simple. It should involve few performance indicators, and have
clear and consistent rules for computation which can easily be done throughout the nation.
While usually gross outcomes are measured, performance indicators should be stated in relative
terms to facilitate cross region and cross program comparisons. The process of creating the
system should be inclusive so as to achieve a consensus and sense of ownership which will
promote professionalism and use of the system. The performance indicators system should be
viewed as a changeable organic process which benefits from regular periodic refinement.
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Auer (1996) provides examples of performance indicators for employment policy among
western European countries, O’Leary (1995) provides examples from eastern Europe.
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A main appeal of performance monitoring is that it provides a basis for a useful
management information system for program operations. Focus on outcomes also promotes a
culture of cost effectiveness and professionalism among employment service staff. Usually such
a system involves follow-up surveys so that survey skills are established. The information
system and survey skills combine to provide and excellent foundation for further evaluation
studies.
Problems can arise in such a system. In particular where surveys are required response
rates are always uneven across regions. Furthermore, when high performance is required there is
incentive for data tampering at the local level. Finally high performance also means that
creaming in program assignment is a distinct possibility. Resulting is wasted social resources.
Monitoring performance in Hungary
To provide an example of the results of performance measurement we draw on the
experience of Hungary where nationwide performance measurement began in January of 1994.
Hungary is currently in the process of developing a relational data base management system for
administration of labor market support programs. Therefore, during the first five years of
measurement performance indicators have been computed by hand on data aggregated at the
county level for the 20 counties in Hungary. Table 1 reports on this evidence.
To present a simple summary of the performance measurement results we focus on a
single type of performance measure which is available across the main active labor market
programs. The measure summarizes the rate of reemployment. It is the percent employed after
participation in each of the listed active labor market programs. Table 1 lists results for three
types of retraining, self-employment, wage subsidy and public service employment (PSE) for the
years 1994 through 1998.
Table 1.

An example of performance measurement in Hungary.
Percent employed at follow-up after various ALMPs, 1994-1998.

ALMP

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Group Retraining (A12)
Individual Retraining (A22)
Retraining Employed (A32)

44.9
58.5
82.2

36.1
42.2
93.6

44.5
51.9
92.8

46.3
51.1
90.4

46.8
51.5
94.7

Self-employment (B2)
Wage Subsidy (C2)
PSE (D2)

91.9
71.1
3.5

90.6
71.4
1.3

90.2
70.1
1.3

88.1
66.3
1.9

91.7
59.1
1.9

For people participating in ALMPs, the results indicate considerable stability in
reemployment rates across the years following each separate program. For each program the
3

reemployment rate fluctuated in a narrow range during the five year period. Also, the relative
success in gaining regular non-subsidized employment across the different programs is quite
stable over the years. The ordering from high to low of reemployment rates remains is the same
in every year.
In reviewing the results it must be remembered that follow-up was usually done 3 months
after participants left the program. While this may be reasonable for retraining of the
unemployed, it is quite soon for self-employment participants, and is probably too soon for the
retraining of the employed and wage subsidy recipients.
Uses of performance monitoring results
A performance measurement system developed for ALMPs will have many uses for
management, but the emphasis in these uses should always be on positive incentives rather than
punitive action. Generally there are five principal uses:
(1) To preserve decentralized decision making about allocation of funds to various
programs and service providers.
(2) To promote superior performance by counties, local offices, and service providers
through positive incentives.
(3) To help identify and correct poor performance through technical assistance and/or
sanctions.
(4) To contribute information on performance to the funding allocation process used by
the tri-partite National Labor Market Committee to allocate funds to the counties.
(5) To ensure compliance with legal requirements of programs.
The outcome found in Hungary that reemployment from individual retraining runs about
5 percentage points higher than for group retraining has influenced training program operations.
Attention was drawn to alternative types of training by the performance monitoring system. In
addition to reemployment rates, cost of reemployment was also a factor. It was observed that
Budapest had used individual retraining at the near complete exclusion of group retraining, and
that the cost per participant reemployed was very high. Budapest was encouraged to reconsider
practices. Other areas also benefitted from management guidance from the National Labor
Center.
Caveats on performance indicators
Since regions within a country vary in their economic strength, before using data on
program performance in deciding budget allocation it is important to account for variations in the
difficulty of finding reemployment. Consequently, an adjustment methodology for performance
4

indicators is necessary. In addition to accounting for regional differences in reemployment
prospects, the adjustment methodology may also provide an easy way to discourage "creaming"
and ensure appropriate targeting of reemployment services.
Creaming refers to the practice of program administrators selecting the most qualified
candidates for program participation so as to increase measured program success. The analogy
is to milk where the richest part, the cream, floats to the top and can be skimmed off. Creaming
is an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most able people get
reemployment assistance, then the benefit to society of the programs is not as great as it might be
otherwise. Highly qualified program entrants have a good chance of becoming reemployed even
without the services offered in the program, while for less qualified applicants the program
services might be the only realistic path to employment.3
An appropriately designed adjustment methodology is an essential component of a
performance management system. In addition to providing a level playing field for comparison
of inter-regional performance, and a means for discouraging creaming by program managers, an
adjustment methodology can be used to encourage targeting of services to those who have
particular difficulty in gaining reemployment, such as: the long term unemployed, those with low
levels of formal education, and persons with physical handicaps.4 Annex 2 to this report presents
a technical discussion of how to develop an adjustment methodology for performance indicators.
A properly designed adjustment methodology can be used to create incentives to prevent
creaming and can provide for an even handed assessment of program performance across
regions.
4.

Net Impact Estimation

The essential distinction of net impact estimation is that outcomes of program
participants are judged relative to an appropriate comparison group. For employment programs
this means that those personal characteristics which enable labor market success are roughly the
same in the two groups. Appropriate comparison group specification can be achieved by proper
sample selection or through statistical means. That is, either by classical field experiments or by
quasi-experimental statistical methods. By taking care in estimation the process yields net rather
than gross impacts. Net impacts are the proper indicator for judging the additional social value
of an employment program.
Classically designed experiments are the ideal for net impact evaluation. If random
assignment is achieved, modeling of behavior and complex econometric methods are not needed
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Evidence of creaming in assignment to training in Hungary is provided by Godfrey, Lazar
and O’Leary (1993) and by O’Leary (1997).
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O'Leary (1996) provides a simple example of how to develop and apply an adjustment
methodology for employment programs.
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to obtain estimates of the net impact of a program. With large samples randomly assigned to
treatment and control groups, observable and unobservable characteristics of the two groups
should not differ on average, so that any difference in outcomes may be attributed to the
program. Program impact may be measured as the simple difference between the means of the
samples of program participants and of control group members on measures of outcomes.
Because this process is easy to understand, simple unadjusted net impact estimates from field
experiments are usually very influential for the purpose of guiding policy.5
Naturally, field experiments are not without potential problems. The first type of
problems are called internal validity problems. These include errors in conducting random
assignment to treatment and control groups, and inconsistent experimental conditions. The first
problem can lead to lack of homogeneity across groups, the second means that the same
treatment was not applied in all cases. The second type of pitfall are called external validity
problems. Time horizon effects can occur when treatment subjects understand that the
experimental service is only temporary rather than permanent. Learning effects can take place
within a community during the course of an experiment whereby the first enrollees act
differently from those enrolled some time after the experiment begins. Hawthorne effects are
responses to treatments not due to the content of service, but simply due to the special attention.
Displacement effects which may be the most critical external validity concern occur when
treatment subjects improve their outcome at the expense of others who are not part of the
experiment.
When there is non-random assignment to either a program participant group or the
comparison group, then statistical methods of correction must be used to offset the selection bias
in order to properly estimate the net impact of a program.6
Recent surveys of microeconomic evaluations of employment programs conducted by
Fay (1996) for OECD member countries and by Meager and Evans (1998) for a selected group
of countries emphasize the importance of accounting for deadweight loss and displacement
effects when measuring the impact of the program. With a mixed bag of findings which reveal
that the net impact of different Employment programs varies widely from one population
subgroup to another, the authors of both surveys argued that targeting of services is crucial to
maximizing the social dividend from public expenditure on employment programs.7
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For examples of employment programs evaluated using a classically designed field experiment,
see Decker and O'Leary (1995).
6
Such methods are called quasi-experimental because they attempt to mimic statistically the ideal
of a true experiment based on random trials (Fay, 1996).
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That is for the following reasons. When an unemployed person participates in an Employment
program which does not improve his/her chance of re-employment, there is a deadweight loss to
society for the expenditure incurred. If a program manager practices creaming in selecting
participants for Employment programs such that the people supported would have secured
6

It is crucial to account for displacement and substitution effects when assessing the net
social benefits of public programs. However, these factors are irrelevant at the individual level
and very difficult to measure at the social level. An evaluation design using a comparison group
automatically accounts for possible deadweight loss by comparing employment program
participants with otherwise similar non-participants. A subgroup analysis of net impact provides
a basis for targeting employment programs.
Quasi-experimental evaluations are often done because they are much cheaper and can be
done more quickly than classical experiments. They can often be done with existing
administrative data which further reduces evaluation costs. This is often the case when there is a
"natural experiment," which is an opportunity presented by a policy change or an economic
event. The main problems with quasi-experimental net impact evaluations is adequately dealing
with the problem of selection bias. This is a thorny issue which often requires complex
statistical techniques to properly address. Such statistical complexity diminishes the policy
value of the findings. Also, like experiment based net impact evaluations. The estimates only
provide a snapshot photo at a point in time. This is distinct from the monitoring approach which
gives consistent information covering a wide geographic area regularly over time.
To show the range of policy relevant outcomes which can be studied, we now examine
net impacts of ALMPs in Hungary on employment, earnings, and receipt of unemployment
compensation. Table 2 summarizes results for five separate outcomes.

employment without the assistance, then a deadweight loss also results. When an Employment
program participant gains re-employment at the direct expense of an otherwise similar job-seeker,
then displacement has occurred. When an employer, either government or private, receives a subsidy
to hire a worker who would otherwise have been hired anyway, then substitution of Employment
program financing for other intended spending has occurred. Johnson and Tomola (1977) provide
a clear example of how to estimate the employment effects of fiscal substitution in direct job
creation programs. They maintain that the degree of substitution increases as a program matures.
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Table 2. Net impact of ALMPs on employment, earnings, and unemployment compensation in Hungary
EMPLOYED1

EMPLNOW2 EARNNOW3 UCMONTHS4

UCPAY5

Hungary
Individual retraining
Group retraining
Public service employment
Wage subsidy
Self-employment

0.11**
0.09**
-0.26**
-0.11**
0.14

0.09**
0.07**
-0.21**
-0.06**
0.16

7
5**
9**
-6
-26

-0.68**
-0.50**
-0.19
0.04**
-1.64**

-43**
-27**
-9**
7
-120

** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in a two-tailed test
1
Ever re-employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment
2
Employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment on the survey date
3
Average monthly earnings from the current job on the survey date (US$)
4
Months of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996
5
Amount of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996, in US$ at exchange rate of US$1.00 = 175.75 Hungarian forints on
1 April 1997, approximately the survey date

Source: O’Leary, Kolodziejczyk, and Lazar (1998).

Retraining and self-employment increase employment rates. Earnings appear to be
boosted by group retraining and PSE, with no measurable effect from other programs. For
unemployment compensation, retraining appears to reduce receipt by about one-half month
while there appears to be even larger savings from self-employment assistance of more than 1.5
months.
Subgroup analysis of net impacts
There are at least two reasons to examine program impacts by population subgroup. One
is to provide information to policy makers who may consider targeting ALMPs to certain groups
like those without a specialization or older unemployed persons. Another is to identify any
possible biases in the effects--a program that benefits only one gender or certain education level
groups may not be considered good policy even if it is cost effective. Table 3 presents the
qualitative results of an analysis of ALMP impacts on important subgroups.
For neither individual nor group retraining were there marked differences by sex, age,
education or occupational group. Subgroup analysis of participation in PSE indicated that
participation was less likely to harm the re-employment chances of women, persons aged 45
years or over, and the better-educated. The greatest benefit of the wage subsidy was felt by
participants in areas of moderate unemployment. However, impacts of wage subsidies did not
vary appreciably by sex, age, or prior occupational group. Self-employment assistance boosted
re-employment rates most among participants aged 45 years and over, and those in areas of high
unemployment.
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Table 3. Summary of Subgroup Net Impact Analysis
Characteristic

Retraining

Gender

Public Service
Employment

Wage
Subsidies

Worse for males
Best for older
persons

Age
Education

Selfemployment

Worse for the
less educated

Occupation
Unemployment
Duration
Best where
unemployment
is moderate

Unemployment
Rate

Best where
unemployment
is high

Impacts of program features
Since ALMPs provided to unemployed job seekers are not homogenous, it is useful to
investigate if variations in different observable dimensions of programs yields different impacts
on the outcome measures for employment and earnings. Again drawing on the evaluation done
in Hungary, Table 4 presents a qualitative summary of net impact estimates of various program
features. As for the above discussion of subgroup impact estimates, all estimates presented
apply to the outcome "currently employed in a non-subsidized job or self-employment"
(EMPLNOW).
For both individual and group retraining in Hungary though the impact on employment
was not significantly different from that for the complementary group it was greater for those
who had contributed personally to the direct cost of individual retraining, for those in retraining
for three months or less, and for those on courses involving 20 or fewer hours per week.
Participation in PSE work, which involves unskilled manual labor, appeared to be the
greatest obstacle to future employment in a normal unsubsidized job or in self-employment,
whereas non-manual and skilled manual work constituted the least impediment. There was no
significant difference by the industry of activity in which PSE occurred, but the reintegration of
ALMP participants into the normal work force appeared to be more successful for PSE in service
employment than in other industries.
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Table 4. Summary of Program Feature Net Impact Analysis
Feature

Retraining

Share in costs

Better with
contribution
(double but not
stat. signif.)

Duration of
ALMP

3 to 12 months

Organized by

Not district
retraining center
20+ hrs/w

Level of skill

Public Service
Employment

Wage
Subsidies

Selfemployment

Manual
unskilled
is worst

Outside of
construction and
services

Outside of
services

Industry
Sole proprietor
vs. partnership
The skill level required in the job which was given a wage subsidy had no significant
effect on the employment outcome. Judged by whether participants were in unsubsidized work
or self-employment on the survey date, those whose subsidized work had been in construction or
the services reaped the least advantage from the wage subsidy scheme.
Self-employment assistance recipients who pursued activities in services industry were
the least likely to experience lasting employment effects. There was not a significant difference
in employment outcomes for those who started sole versus partnership business activities.
Not a part of the program feature analysis, but an important indicator of program impact
secondary employment effects of self-employment assistance in Hungary was also investigated.
It was found that on the survey date 17.6 percent of those receiving assistance had hired at least
one other worker. Indeed, one successful recipient claimed to have hired 12 workers. The mean
number of workers employed by those who did recruit was 1.75, and the mean hired among all
assistance recipients was 0.31. About half of hires had previously been unemployed.
Every ALMP has a variety of features and important outcomes. The presentation in this
and the previous sections of chapter 4 are not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all
10

outcomes or evaluation approaches possible. The analysis and examples were intended to be
suggestive of the potential value of the net impact approach to program evaluation.
Uses of net impact estimates
In the previous chapter the point was made that net impact analysis is a supplement to
performance monitoring. The latter being mainly a management tool and the former useful for
policy development. There is much more overlap in use of the two sets of results than that
division suggested. This section briefly discusses four uses of net impact estimates of ALMPs.
The four are: (1) policy formulation, (2) targeting, (3) program management, and (4)
accountability. In our exposition we hope to make clear the added value which net impact
analysis provides to administrators, users, and decision makers of employment programs.
Policy formulation decisions concerning questions of whether to continue, expand,
curtail, or cancel government employment programs should be well informed with objective
information. Policy makers within labor ministries, national labor centers, and national
legislatures often require information about the return on government spending--the return on
investment. The net benefits for programs may be assessed from different perspectives: society,
individuals, government, and programs. Such a measurement requires estimates of the
incremental value of programs in cost-benefit analysis.
To improve the overall cost effectiveness of programs and to increase the value to
customers, it is useful to know what programs yield the greatest benefit for different clients.
Subgroup analysis of program net impacts can provide exactly the information needed to do
informed targeting of reemployment services. Such information is available no other way.
As emphasized in chapter 3, performance indicators systems are a valuable tool for
program management. Such systems track gross outcomes and by themselves have no
mechanism for establishing what is an adequate or superior level of performance. Net impact
analysis can provide baseline standards for gross outcome performance monitoring systems.
Such standards can be used with an adjustment methodology system to set reasonable targets for
regions on separate employment programs.
Spending of public funds for social improvement requires public accountability. Periodic
reports to parliament, prime ministers, and voters are crucial for continuance. Either over the
short term or the long term all spending programs are discretionary. Good programs only
survive and flourish when credible evidence of value can be objectively demonstrated. The
methods reviewed in this chapter provide strategies for determining which public efforts to
promote employment provide the greatest value.
5.

Conclusion

When the net benefits of an ALMP are being evaluated, it must be made clear whether
the program is being assessed from a social, governmental, program or individual perspective. It
11

is impossible properly to measure every detailed factor bearing on such computations. However,
it is possible to measure the main elements for such computations and net program impacts are
central.
It should be recognized however that the decision to implement, continue, curtail or
cancel programs for labor market support also has a political dimension. During a period of
dramatic change in conditions of employment security, there can be an irresistible imperative for
ALMPs. In such times, the rules for return on investment cannot be blindly applied without
regard for social stability, however difficult that may be to quantify.
Aside from their net impact, ALMPs have a direct effect of easing labor market tensions
because of the simple fact that those taking part in ALMPs are not counted as unemployed
during their participation. In Hungary during the mid-1990s for example, participation in
ALMPs reduced measured unemployment by 2 percentage points below what it would have been
otherwise. Furthermore, while ALMP participation does not always immediately result in stable
re-employment, for individual program participants the experience serves at least to interrupt an
otherwise continuous spell of unemployment.
In times when unemployment is high and the demand for labor is low, we should not
expect uniformly high net impacts from ALMPs. The examples from Hungary reported in this
paper highlight the importance of carefully assessing active labor programs so that public funds
can be utilized as efficiently as possible while pursuing the social goal of returning the
unemployed to gainful work.
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